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the last page
debating preventive war

an arena of law of power?

By Kenneth Rodman

By the time you read this essay, we will almost
certainly be at war, probably without the authorization of the United Nations. A group of students
asked me whether such a war would be legal under
international law. A second question is, “Do such
considerations matter?”
The traditional international law answer to the
first question is no. Under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, a state has the right to act unilaterally
in case of individual or collective self-defense
against an armed attack. The Bush Doctrine
exceeds these stipulations by asserting a right to
wage preventive war against rogue states, such
as Iraq, that augment their capabilities through
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) even in the
absence of a specific provocation. Under Chapter
VII, the charter does allow for responses to “threats
to the peace” other than armed attack, but such
actions must be enforced multilaterally through
the Security Council.
Administration officials counter this with the
doctrine of “implied authorization.” If the Security
Council passes a Chapter VII resolution declaring Iraqi possession of WMD to be contrary to
international law, the U.S. has the implicit right to
enforce that resolution militarily even if the Security
Council does not explicitly authorize force itself.
Should these legal debates matter? To some
extent, the answer is yes. Legal critics of the Bush
Doctrine rightly note that by stretching the traditional definition of self-defense to include preventive war, it may set precedents for others—e.g.,
India with Pakistan—to which the U.S. might
object. Acting through the Security Council also
confers more legitimacy and, hence, more cooperation with U.S. actions. Administration defenders could plausibly argue that without unilateral
pressure from the United States, Security Council
resolutions would be meaningless.
Realists, however, warn that such arguments
ought not to be definitive because international
relations is not primarily an arena of law but one
of politics and power. The relevant question to a
realist is not whether a U.S.-led war violates the
U.N. Charter or whether Iraq is in noncompliance with Security Council resolutions. Rather, it
is whether the threats we face render traditional
definitions of self-defense obsolete.
The Bush Doctrine answers both questions in
the affirmative. September 11 demonstrates that
we live in a different world from the Cold War, when
we faced geopolitical adversaries who could be
contained and deterred. These old devices won’t
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work against stateless terrorists against whom we
can’t retaliate, fanatical
or irrational leaders who
welcome martyrdom or
increasingly destructive
weapons. Traditional
legal rules regarding
self-defense have been
overtaken by events.
In my view, the ad
ministration has it right
when it comes to terrorists, such as Al Qaeda,
since they act on an ideology of martyrdom and
lack a return address.
Iraq, however, is a more familiar strategic threat.
Some administration officials contend that
Saddam is undeterrable as evidenced by his use
of chemical weapons against the Kurds. While
that represents a war crime for which Saddam
should be indicted at The Hague, it does not
demonstrate that he is undeterrable, since the
Kurds lack the ability to respond in kind. And
when confronted with adversaries who could
retaliate with disproportionate power, he was
deterred—which explains his reluctance to use
chemical and biological weapons against the U.S.
and Israel during the first Persian Gulf War. Or as
one foreign policy analyst wrote: “These regimes
[e.g., Iraq] are living on borrowed time, so there
need be no sense of panic about them. Rather,
the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire
WMD, their weapons will be unusable because
any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.” Those words were published in January
2000 by an advisor to the Bush campaign named
Condoleeza Rice.
If you were to ask Rice what changed her
view, her answer would be 9-11 and the fear that
Iraq may transfer WMD to groups like Al Qaeda.
If it were true, it would irrefutably merge the Iraqi
problem with the threat of terrorism and, in my
view, justify the use of force, even unilaterally.
While one cannot rule this out, history and
logic indicate otherwise. First, Iraq’s Ba’athist Party
and Al Qaeda are radically different organizations,
the former being a secular nationalist movement
that exterminated its religious opposition. Second,
Iraq’s support of terrorist organizations has been
limited to those under its absolute control. Al

Qaeda, by contrast, would not be controllable by
Baghdad. Hence, Saddam is unlikely to transfer
weapons whose use against U.S. targets would
almost inevitably be linked to Baghdad and trigger
the very regime-changing invasion he would like
to avoid.
The final factor in establishing a political test is
the cost and risk of war. First, given that our goal
will be regime change, Iraq can be expected to
use whatever capability it has to inflict maximum
damage—e.g., the use of WMD against U.S. troops.
Second, the war is likely to increase the ability of
Al Qaeda to find additional recruits to its cause
in the Middle East and the West, to the detriment
of the war on terrorism. Finally, there are the burdens of occupation and post-war reconstruction.
As one former cabinet official put it: “Once you’ve
got Baghdad, it’s not clear what you do with it.
… How long does the military have to stay, and
what happens once we leave?” Former Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney raised those questions in
1991 and they are no less pertinent today.
At one level, the debate over the war can be
seen in terms of competing legalisms—i.e., a
traditional defense of the U.N. Charter versus
enforcement of what would otherwise be toothless U.N. resolutions. Those arguments, however,
should be subordinated to the more relevant tests
of prudence and necessity. Ultimately, it is on those
grounds that one needs to make the case against
unilateral war.
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